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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines some of the trade-offs to be
considered when assigning sealift to a deployment. How
sealift costs are defined, calculated and assigned is
discussed. The trade-offs between different voyage
characteristics, vessel types, and vessel mixes are compared
using time and money as the standard measures.




I. INTRODUCTION ............. ..... ................... 1
A. BACKGROUND ................. .................. 1
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT .............. ............... 2
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ............ ............. 3
D. CONTENTS OF THE THESIS ........... ............ 3
II. SEALIFT ASSIGNMENT, ACQUISITION AND TRADE-OFFS . 5
A. THE MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND AND ITS STRATEGIC
SEALIFT MISSION ............... ................ 5
B. SEALIFT ASSIGNMENT AND ACQUISITION ..... ...... 5
C. TRADE-OFFS ................. .................. 7
1. THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN VESSEL SPEED AND FUEL
COST ................... .................... 9
2. PER DIEM AS AN ADDITIONAL TRADE-OFF FACTOR 10
3. DISCHARGE RATES AND PORT AND COSTS ..... .. 12
D. IMPORTANCE OF TRADE-OFFS ..... ........... 13
III. METHODOLOGY ............ ................... 15
A. BACKGROUND ............. .................. 15
B. COST CLASSIFICATIONS ....... ............. 16
1. Wages and Benefits ...... ............. 18
2. Lease ............... ................... 18
iv
3. Stores and Supplies ....... ............ 18
4. Repairs and Maintenance ... .......... 18
5. Miscellaneous Operating Expenses .... ...... 18
6. Fuel .............. .................... 19
7. Port Costs ............ ................. 21
8. Activation and Deactivation Costs ..... 21
9. Special Charter Bonus ..... ........... 23
10. Canal Transit Costs .... ............ 23
11. MSC overhead ......... ............... 24
C. PORT INFORMATION ......... ............... 25
D. DEPLOYMENT OF UNITS ........ .............. 26
IV. DATA ANALYSIS ............. .................. 29
A. TOTAL DEPLOYMENT COSTS AND DEPLOYMENT DAYS . 29
B. ROROs COMPARED TO BREAKBULKS ... ......... 37
C. SPEED'S IMPACT ON PER DIEM AND FUEL COSTS . . 38
D. THE IMPACT OF SUEZ CANAL TRANSITS ON TOTAL VOYAGE
COST .............. .................... 41
E. THE IMPACT OF ACTIVATION AND DEACTIVATION COSTS 44
1. Activation and Deactivation Fee Based on
Voyage Length (Distance) ... .......... 45
2. No Activation and Deactivation Fee ..... .. 46
3. Impact of Total Activation Fee Only . . .. 48
F. PORT LOADING CAPABILITY AND ITS IMPACT ON TOTAL
DEPLOYMENT TIME .......... ................ 50
G. TRADE-OFFS AMONG VESSEL MIXES ... ......... 51
v
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .... .......... 56
A. CONCLUSIONS ............ .................. 56
B. RECOMMENDATIONS .......... ................ 59
C. FINAL NOTE ............. .................. 60
LIST OF REFERENCES ............. .................. 62




Strategic sealift is a primary mission area of the U.S.
Navy, and is a major factor in the response and mobilization
capability of the Nation's Armed Forces. Sealift can account
for 90-95% of cargo movement during a major operation. Because
of the importance of sealift and the magnitude of the
associated costs, it is important to understand the trade-offs
among different sealift alternatives. These trade-offs can be
measured in time and money.
Numerous types of vessels are used in a deployment. They
include government owned and operated vessels, and commercial
vessels. The type of vessel used can depend upon scenario
characteristics, legislative restrictions, or a combination of
both.
In the commercial arena, vessel selection is made after as
many of the trade-offs as possible have been considered. A
trade-off could be increased speed versus increased fuel
consumption and the related lower total per diem charges. In
the Department of Defense (DOD) realm, the trade-offs to be
considered include those from the commercial arena in addition
to some which are unique to DOD.
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The present, fiscally constrained environment under which
DOD operates demands that commanders carefully allocate their
resources. Resources include not only dollars but assets such
as ships. Therefore an understanding of the trade-offs to be
considered in vessel assignment is important. This will help
ensure optimal use of available resources.
This understanding of trade-offs will aid a commander in
determining what type of vessel should be assigned to a cargo
and may influence the choice of a load port. Because each
cargo is assigned a priority by the supported Commander in
Chief (CINC) it is important that vessels are assigned in a
manner that matches the CINC's priorities and that this
assignment is within the limits of the law and available
assets. In other words, a high priority cargo should be moved
in a shorter time than a low priority cargo. Money should be
allocated in a manner which allows this to happen.
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
This thesis will attempt to answer several questions about
some of tbe trade-offs to be considered when employing sealift
during a deployment. These include:
1. How are sealift costs derived and assigned?
2. What are some of the trade-offs to be considered?
3. What impact do these trade-offs have on total cost of
a deployment?




This thesis will examine some of the trade-off
considerations when deploying units with sealift assets.
Information on cost derivation and assignment and capabilities
of vessel and port assets were acquired through interviews and
readings of various Military and Government reports and
publications. The Military Sealift Command (MSC) and Military
Traffic Management Command (MTMC) were the main sources of
information.
Wherever possible, actual cost data is employed to analyze
the trade-offs. if this data was not available, cost
estimates, based on government agencies' practices or
experiences, and cost averages, based on statistical
practices, are used.
Once cost and port capability data was obtained, a
spreadsheet model is used to determine total costs and times
for deployment for various options based on MTMC scenarios.
D. CONTENTS OF THE THESIS
The following chapter contains a historical overview of
how sealift has been acquired and assigned. It also includes
an overview of some of the trade-offs traditionally associated
with sealift.
Chapter III describes the methodology used in assigning
sealift costs.
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Chapter IV discusses the findings of the quantitative
analysis. An in-depth discussion of the trade-offs is also
included.
Cha;ýer V comprises the conclusions, recommendations for
the use of trade-off analysis and for further study, and a
final note.
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II. SEALIFT ASSIGNMENT, ACQUISITION AND TRADE-OFFS
A. THE MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND AND ITS STRATEGIC SEALIFT
MISSION
The United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)
provides global air, land and sea transportation to meet
national security objectives. As one of TRANSCOM's
components, the Military Sealift Command (MSC) has the primary
mission of providing sealift for strategic mobility in support
of national security objectives. This mission, known as
strategic sealift, demands the capability to deploy and
sustain military forces wherever and whenever needed, as
rapidly and for as long as operational requirements dictate.
Sealift requirements are met through use of government owned
(or controlled) vessels, chartered commercial vessels, and
other ships available through applicable laws, treaties and
international agreements such as those provided through NATO
and other nations.
B. SEALIFT ASSIGNMENT AND ACQUISITION
Under the best conditions, the deployment of forces during
a crisis is the result of an extensive planning process during
which the Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) file,
"a computer-supported database portion of an operation plan
that contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo
5
and personnel data, and movement data for the operations
plan," is developed [Ref. 1: p. 1-34]. Information includes
prioritized arrival of units deployed to support the Operation
Plan in Complete Format (OPLAN), routing of forces to be
deployed, movement associated with deploying forces and
estimates of transportation requirements [Ref. 1: p. 1-34].
Under worse conditions, no TPFDD exists and planning is short-
fused and ongoing as the deployment evolves. Such was the
case during Desert Shield. Either way, assignment of vessels
to move cargo is aided by computer simulation and restricted
by asset availability.
The precedence in which vessels are used during a
deployment or exercise is strictly regulated. The Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Competition in Contracting Act
(CICA) and numerous cargo preference acts restrict the sealift
assignment process. The priority for assignment of vessels is
as follows:
1. Maximum utilization of available U.S. flag commercial
carriers.
2. Commercial vessels under charter to MSC which are
part of the MSC force. The MSC Force is comprised of
government-owned ships assigned to Commander Military Sealift
Command (COMSC) and privately-owned ships under the control of
COMSC at any given time.
3. Activation of Ready Reserve Force (RRF) vessels
4. Chartering of foreign flag vessels. [Ref. 21
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It must be noted however that exercise plans and TPFDD's
frequently identify one specific type of vessel to carry a
designated unit. This is frequently the case when FSS, RRF and
MPF vessels are employed. During a large scale deployment of
forces once a vessel has completed it's assigned mission it is
put into the common user pool and assigned cargos as necessary
and within the above priority guidelines.
Of course, availability of assets plays a major role in
what type of ship cargo will be transported in. During
Operation Desert Shield, vessels from the Maritime Preposition
Force (MPF) and RRF, and U.S. and foreign chartered vessels
were employed. A shortage of available U.S. flag vessels
resulted in a number of foreign charters, especially roll-on,
roll-off (RO/RO) vessels. Of the 206 ships MSC chartered
between August 10, 1990 and January 18, 1991, 177 were foreign
flag ships [Ref. 3: p. 23. The RRF is the U.S. Government's
main source of commercially designed, militarily suitable,
general cargo ships capable of carrying military equipment.
Defense exercises frequently include the activation of RRF
vessels to either test the activation system or because the
RRF is the only source of a specific type of vessel.
C. TRADE-OFFS
Webster defines trade-off as "the exchange of one thing in
return for another, especially relinquishment of something
desirable, as a benefit or advantage for one regarded as more
7
desirable" [Ref. 4: p. 1224]. A trade-off is optimized when
net improvements can no longer be obtained through such an
exchange, and hence no other allocation can make better use of
the available resources under consideration.
During sealift operations, a number of trade-offs can be
considered. However, due to current legislation, some are not
viable. A controversial trade-off not presently considered is
the low cost of chartering foreign vessels compared to the
cost of chartering U.S. flag vessels.
AFSC Pub 1 lists a number of limitations to be considered
in strategic transportation decision making. This includes
limitations of the support capabilities; limitations of the
personnel processing, material handling and material storage;
capabilities of theater transportation and required transport
time. [Ref. 1: p. 6-60] Nowhere are fiscal limitations
mentioned.
However, fiscal trade-offs for a deployment can be
measured. For example the time and cost differences between
deploying relatively slower, smaller breakbulk vessels and
faster, larger RO/ROs or Fast Sealift Ships (FSS) can be
assessed. The cost of increasing a vessel's speed and the
associated increase in fuel consumption; the load/discharge
rate of one type of vessels, say a RO/RO, instead of another,
perhaps a breakbulk; and transit times of various vessels and
their associated voyage costs can all be measured and
compared.
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1. THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN VESSEL SPEED AND FUEL COST
Stopford discusses the fuel trade-off in his book
Maritime Economics [Ref. 5: pp. 108-1111 Both increased
speed and reduced costs are desired. One can be had only at
the expense of the other and hence the trade-off. The amount
of fuel actually used by a vessel underway depends on its hull
condition and the speed at which it is operated [Ref. 4: p.
1101. The fuel consumption of an FSS at different speeds is
shown in Table 1. Fuel usage per nautical mile increases as
speed increases, and nautical miles steamed per barrel
decreases as speed increases.
TABLE 1. FSS HOURLY FUEL CONSUMPTION
Speed Barrels Per Hour Barrel Per Nautical Mile
(Knots) of Fuel Nautical Mile Per Barrel
20 42.00 2.10 .4762
21 55.00 2.62 .3818
22 67.75 3.08 .3247
23 73.58 3.20 .3126
24 81.13 3.38 .2958
25 90.00 3.60 .2778
26 99.58 3.83 .2611
27 114.75 4.25 .2353
28 131.58 4.70 .2128
29 141.25 4.87 .2053
30 153.58 5.12 .1953
31 164.92 5.32 .188
(Ref. 61.
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Figure 1 graphically displays this trade-off, whereby fuel
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Figure 1. FSS Trade-off between Speed and Barrels Consumed
Per Nautical Mile
2. PER DISM AS AN ADDITIONAL TRADE-OFF FACTOR
Vessel voyage speed directly affects underway time and
subsequently the number of days for which per diem is paid.
For example if speed is reduced, fuel costs will decrease, but
there will be an increase in the days required to complete the
voyage and therefore an increase in voyage costs. The opposite
occurs if speed is increased. Table 2 shows the transit time
from Mobile, AL, to Ad Damman, Saudi Arabia, (9580 nautical
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miles) at various speeds. Assuming $20,000 as the per diem
cost of an RRF vessel [Ref.7J, voyage per diem costs were
calculated by converting transit times from hours to days
(rounding was done to the nearest day). As shown, per diem
costs decrease as speed increases.
TABLE 2. TRANSIT TIME (HOURS) FROM MOBILE, ALABAMA TO AD
DAMMAM, SAUDI ARABIA AND PER DIEM COST FOR DIFFERENT
SPEEDS
Speed Transit Per Diem Speed Transit Per Diem
(Knots) Time Cost (Knots) Time Cost
14 685 $580,000 23 417 $340,000
15 639 $540,000 24 399 $340,000
16 599 $500,000 25 383 $320,000
17 564 $480,000 26 368 $320,000
18 532 $440,000 27 355 $300,000
19 504 $420,000 28 342 $280,000
20 479 $400,000 29 330 $280,000
21 456 $380,000 30 319 $260,000
22 436 $360,000 31 309 $260,000
Figure 2 graphically represents this data. As a
vessel's speed increases it will spend less days at sea, and
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Figure 2. Trade-off between Speed and Per Diem
3. DISCHARGE RATES AND PORT AND COSTS
Load and discharge rates for a vessel are also
important. Vessels with slower load and discharge rates can
be more expensive due to additional days for which daily per
diem and port charges are assessed. However, more modern
ships with quicker material handling equipment may have higher
per diem rates. Table 3 shows load and discharge rates (in 20
hour days) for various types of vessels [Ref. 8: p. 33 and
Ref. 9]. Once again, total per diem charges are dependent
upon the speed of discharge. Everything else remaining the
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same, vessels with slower material handling capabilities will
incur higher total voyage costs.
TABLE 3. LOAD AND DISCHARGE TIME (20 HOUR DAYS)
Vessel Type Load (Days) Discharge (Days)
FSS 2 2
RRF RORO 1 1
RRF Breakbulk 4 4
Commercial RORO 1 1
Small Commercial 4 4
Breakbulk
D. IMPORTANCE OF TRADE-OFFS
Consideration of trade-offs is essential to the efficient
use of limited resources. As budgets get smaller and
commanders become more responsible for the costs associated
with their decisions, effectively identifying costs and
potential savings is imperative. As unit commanders become
more responsible for important fiscal decisions, they must be
able to accurately measure and compare different alternatives.
When it comes to strategic sealift decisions, as many
trade-offs as possible must be considered. Once potential
trade-off factors are identified they must be analyzed
together to optimize the trade-off between them. For example,
the savings in per diem costs due to an increase in speed must
be weighed against the increased cost in fuel. The amount of
time each type of vessels spends in port for loading and
discharging, i.e., voyage costs, must be compared to the
different vessel types' operating costs.
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When forces are deployed, reaching their destination as
quickly as possible is the primary objective. Identifying and
comparing the trade-offs between deployment time or speed and
cost becomes important in allocating ships to different units
or cargos.
With a finite supply of vessels available to support
transportation needs, vessel allocation should be done in a
manner which matches the supported Commander- in-Chief's (CINC)
prioritization of cargo. A high priority unit or cargo should
deploy on a faster ship, such as an FSS, while a low priority
unit should be assigned a slower breakbulk or RORO. Of
course, faster ships are more expensive.
Cost and time become uniform measures with which to
compare the different trade-offs. Allocation of
transportation funds should reflect a cargo's priority. A
unit or cargo considered to be high priority by the supported
CINC should have a larger transportation budget compared to
the budget of a lower priority unit. More money means a
faster deployment. Just as unit or cargo priority should
determine the allocation of transportation funds, the amount
of transportation funds available should drive transportation




The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), as reported in the
New York Times [Ref. 10], lists seven conflicts that
might draw United States forces into combat. One of these is
an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Based on the
recent deployment of forces to the Persian Gulf in support of
Operation Desert Shield, the trade-off studies presented
later in Chapter IV analyze deployment cost for units moving
from Oakland, CA; Mobile, AL; and Norfolk, VA, to Ad Dammam,
Saudi Arabia, with vessels returning empty to their port of
origin. The combination of vessels assigned to transport the
units is based upon the Military Traffic Management Command
Deployment Planning Guide [Ref. 11].
The trade-offs between the following vessels are
compared: FSS, CAPE H class, RRF C3/C4 vessels, RRF C7
vessels, commercial small breakbulks (BB), and commercial
ROROs.
Total cost and time required to complete the deployment
are the measures used to quantify the trade-offs between the
various deployment alternatives available to a unit.
Initially the scope of this thesis was to include an
analysis of the trade-off between deployment time and speed.
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The increased cost in fuel consumption was to be measured for
various classes of ships over ranges of speed for each vessel
class. Contact with various organizations, the Maritime
Administration (MARAD), MSC, American President Lines and the
Massachusetts Maritime Academy, revealed that this information
is not available for RRF vessels or similar commercial
vessels. This data was available only for the FSS. Another
problem encountered was conflicting cost data. Specific
problems in acquiring data will be discussed when the
individual cost classifications are presented.
Cost data was acquired through numerous interviews and
literature on the deployment of forces during Operation Desert
Shield. Average figures were used and their derivation is
explained later.
B. COST CLASSIFICATIONS
Cost classifications are broken into two main categories,
per diem and voyage costs. The per diem costs are daily fixed
costs. The principal components of these operating costs are:
PD=WB+L+S+RM+E
where: PD = per diem
WB - wages and benefits
L - Leasing cost for the vessel
S - stores and supplies
RM = contractor maintenance and repairs
E - miscellaneous operating expenses.
Table 4 shows the per diem costs by vessel type. The per
diem cost figures received from MSC had some of the cost
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categories lumped together. This is the case with the FSS and
chartered vessels for which some of this information is not
required in the contracting process.
TABLE 4. PER DIEM COST BY VESSEL TYPE









The primary elements of voyage costs are:
VC = F + P + AD + B +C + MO
where: VC = voyage costs
F = fuel
P = port costs
AD - activation and deactivation costs
B = special charter bonus
C = Canal Transit Fees
MO = MSC Overhead
Voyage costs are determined by the vessel's voyage
characteristics (other than voyage length as it impacts total
per diem). Voyage characteristics include warranted speed,
ship type and the port itself. Route, and load and discharge
ports determine the amount of fuel consumed, the amount of
time inport and whether canal tolls are paid. If applicable
to the vessel type, these factors also determine the
activation and deactivation costs or special charter bonus
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costs that are incurred. The amount charged as MSC overhead
is also dependent upon the type of vessel and how long it is
used.
1. Wages and Benefits
Crew costs encompass all direct and indirect charges
incurred when crewing the vessel and can account for over half
the operating costs. Wages, overtime, subsistence, social
insurance, pensions and provisions are all included in this
amount.
2. Lease
This figure applies only to chartered vessels. It is
the rent for use of the vessel. This figure is included in
the per them rate charged by the ship owner.
3. Stores and Supplies
Stores and supplies include all consumable items such
as spare parts and lubricating oil. For the FSS and charter
vessels these costs are included in the contract price.
4. Repairs and Maintenance
This includes all costs associated with maintaining
the vessel within contract standards. Routine and corrective
maintenance are included. For the chartered vessels these
costs are included in the contract price.
S. Miscellaneous Operating Expenses
Miscellaneous operating expenses includes such things
as communications cost and crew travel. For the FSS this also
includes the daily rental for their assigned layberths. This
rent is paid even when the vessels are deployed.
6. Fuel
The determination of an average fuel consumption for
each classification of vessels was dependent upon the amount
of information available. For the FSS and CAPE H class
vessels, consumption figures were the same for each vessel
within the class. For the C3, C4 and C7 class vessels, a
weighted average was determined using consumption rates for
all vessels within the class. For the commercial vessels, a
random sample for each class was selected and consumption
rates available from MSC were averaged. Vessel speeds for the
specific consumption rates were determined with a weighted
average.
Vessel fuel consumption both underway, at warranted
speed, and inport are presented in Table 5. Fuel types are
180 (Intermediate Fuel Oil 180 Centistrokes), 380
(Intermediate Fuel Oil 380 Centistrokes) , DFM (Diesel Fuel
Marine) and MDO (Marine Diesel Oil). For Suez Canal transits
it is assumed that each vessel would take one day each way to
travel the canal, and fuel consumption would equal one-half
day inport and one-half day underway. For vessels transitting
from Oakland it is assumed that vessels will stop for bunkers
one time each way. Fuel consumption will be equivalent to one
day inport and one day underway.
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TABLE 5. AVERAGE FUEL CONSUMPTION (BARRELS) INPORT AND
UNDERWAY AT WARRANTED SPEED (KNOTS)
Vessel Warranted Fuel Underway Fuel Inport
Type Speed Type Consumption Type Consumption
FSS 30 DFM 3,686 DFM 300
CAPE H 18 180 630 180 50
C7 20 380 1,225 380 90
C4 18 380 610 380 75
C3 18 380 418.3 380 65
U.S. 16.9 380 333 380 42.45
Small
BB
FRGN 15.7 180 202 MDO 21
Small
BB (a)
U.S. 17.5 380 345 MDO 39.5
RORO
FRGN 16.9 180 267 MDO 22
RORO
(a ) ---
[Ref. 13, 14 & 15]
Note: (a) FRGN denotes foreign chartered vessel.
Fuel costs account for a large portion of voyage
costs. Cost per barrel for the four fuel types burned were
calculated by averaging the market prices published in last
issue of each month in 1992 in Fairplay. Fuel prices for ten
ports along the routes to be traveled by the vessels were
used. The FSS consume Diesel Fuel Marine (DFM) and the
average cost for 1992 was provided by MSC [Ref. 16).
Cost per barrel for the four fuel types are in Table 6.
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TABLE 6. AVERAGE PRICE PER BARREL PER FUEL TYPE DURING 1992
Abbreviated Fuel Type Cost Per
Name I I Barrel
180 Intermediate Fuel Oil 180 $14.33
1__ _ Centistrokes
380 Intermediate Fuel Oil 380 $13.64
.11 Centistrokes I
DFM Diesel Fuel Marine $26.46
MDO Marine Diesel Oil $15.00
[Ref. 16]
7. Port Costs
Average port costs for each type of vessel were
provided by MSC. There are two figures for each vessel class.
Charges for the first and last day are higher and include
berthing charges (tugs, etc.) and hotel services. The cost
for all other days is for hotel services only. Port costs are
shown in Table 7.
TABLE 7. PORT COSTS BY VESSEL TYPE
Vessel Type First and Last Day Remaining Days
FSS $7,300 $1,300
RRF RORO $5,800 $1,100
RRF BB $5,800 $1,300
Commercial RORO $6,100 $1,100
Commercial BB $5,500 $1,000
[Ref. 17]
8. Activation and Deactivation Costs
These costs apply only to the RRF vessels. Costs for
activation and deactivation vary depending upon the source.
Admiral Donovan of MSC testified activation costs were $1.4
21
million per ship [Ref. 18:p. 431 while Captain Lebeck
of MARAD testified activation costs were $1.6 million per ship
[Ref.18:p. 102]. An average of $1.5 million will be used. An
MSC figure of $3.5 million for the deactivation will be used.
Activation and deactivation for an exercise is paid for by the
user. During Desert Shield the activation price was initially
charged to the first user of the vessel and deactivation costs
were to be charged to the last user of the vessel. Due to
numerous cries of foul from the various services who desired
the cost to be split among all users of the vessels, the
Department of the Navy absorbed activation and deactivation
costs. [Ref. 19]
For most of this analysis, the cost of activation and
deactivation will be assigned per voyage. It is assumed that
each vessel will return to its original load port. The user
pays from portal to portal, or for the round-trip. For a 255.5
day period, approximately the time of the deployment for
Desert Storm, the number of round-trip voyages per vessel type
was determined. By dividing the $5 million by the number of
round-trip voyages possible, the user's share of the
activation and deactivation costs per voyage was determined.
For example, a C3 breakbulk traveling between Mobile and Ad
Dammam at 18 knots would make 4.3014 trips. The user would be
charged $1,162,753 as his portion of the activation and
deactivation fee.
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9. Special Charter Bonus
This element is applicable to only the foreign flag
vessels. There was no average bonus as the amount of the
special charter bonus was driven by the cash position of the
company. Many foreign operating companies did not have
sufficient capital to cover start up costs for a vessel. A
major portion of these start up costs were for recruitment and
transportation of crew members. These foreign vessels were
offered at a low per diem rate with the special charter bonus
used to adjust the rate up to an amount close to the per diem
rate of vessels offered at a higher per diem rate with no
special charter bonus. [Ref. 20]
For this analysis an average special charter bonus for
foreign vessels was determined and added to the voyage costs
of each vessel. The average special charter bonus was
calculated by totaling the bonuses paid during Desert Storm
and dividing by the total number of foreign vessels
contracted. The average bonus is $177,566. Like the
activation and deactivation costs, the portion of the bonus
charged to the user is dependent upon how many round trip
voyages a vessel can make in the seven month period.
10. Canal Transit Costs
Vessels departing from and returning to Mobile and
Norfolk will transit the Suez Canal. Each vessel is assumed
to take one day to transit the Canal whether transitting north
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or south. Cost for canal transits are dependent upon tonnage.
However, numerous surcharges are applied for such things as
time of transit, if the vessel is listed in Jane's Fighting
Ships, late transit fees, etc. While the base fees for the
types of vessels considered in this thesis range between $29
and $60 thousand, the actual costs during Desert Storm were
between $58 and $392 thousand. [Ref. 21] Due to the
variation in fees, MSC established standard fees to be charged
to the user based on seven vessel classifications. These are
listed in Table 8.
TABLE 8. SUEZ CANAL TRANSIT COSTS
VESSEL TYPE CANAL TRANSIT COST CANAL TRANSIT COST
(LOADED) (EMPTY)
FSS $275,000 $225,000
RRF BB $130,000 $95,000
RRF RO/RO $140,000 $105,000
LARGE COMMERCIAL $120,000 $120,000
RO/RO




MSC overhead is calculated as a percentage of the
total cost of providing transportation to a unit. The total
cost includes all operating and voyage costs. Therefore
activation and deactivation fees, canal transits and special
charter bonuses are included in the calculation. MSC, a Naval
Industrial Fund (NIF) activity, uses this money to cover its
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operating expenses, including the cost of civilian labor.
Percentages used in calculating overhead charges are in Table
9.
TABLE 9. OVERHEAD CHARGE (PERCENT) PER VESSEL TYPE





Units will be deployed from three United States ports;
Norfolk, VA, Mobile, AL, and Oakland, CA, to Ad Dammam, Saudi
Arabia. These ports were chosen because units were actually
deployed from them during Desert Shield. Based on discussions
with Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) personnel at
each port, the number of vessels, per class, that can be
loaded at one time are in Table 10. For example in Oakland
four FSS, four CAPE H, six breakbulks, or five ROROs can be
loaded at one time. Combinations of these vessels can also be
done. For example, two CAPE H and two FSS can be loaded at
the same time.
It is assumed that commercial operations will not be
disrupted and that only piers presently available for military
use will be utilized. Due to Ad Dammam's superior port
capabilites it is assumed that the port will be able to match
the loading times of the three U.S. ports [Ref. 24].
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TABLE 10. NUMBER OF VESSEL THAT CAN BE LOADED AT ONE TIME
PER PORT
Vessel Type Norfolk, VA Mobile, AL Oakland, CA
FSS 2 2 4
CAPE H 2 2 4
Breakbulk 3 5 6
RORO 2 2 5
[Ref. 25, 26 and 27].
D. DEPLOYMENT OF UNITS
Using some of the vessel combinations in the Military
Traffic Management Command Deployment Planning Guide, the
total costs and number of days required to complete the
deployment of an Armored Division and Light Infantry Division
were calculated [Ref 11.:pp. C-15 & C-17]. These two units
were chosen because of the large difference in their vessel
requirements. The Armored Division's cargo capacity
requirements are relatively large compared to those of the
Light Infantry Division.
Vessel mixes, including C3 or C4 and U.S. owned or foreign
owned (FRGN) were assigned as follows. The C3 and C4 mix is
a ratio of the actual number of these type ships in the RRF in
1990. There were 30 C3 and 18 C4. Therefore when a
deployment scenario calls for a specific number of C3/C4
breakbulks, 62.5 percent will be C3 and 37.5 percent will be
C4. As for the U.S owned and foreign owned mix, use follows
contracting regulations, and U.S. ships are given first
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priority in contracting. During Desert Shield, 12 U.S. owned
small breakbulks were used. Therefore the first 12 breakbulks
will be U.S. owned with the remainder being chartered from the
foreign market. One large RORO, the MALLORY LYKES, was
chartered from the U.S. market. The first RORO assigned will
be U.S. with the remainder from the foreign market.
Some of the vessel options to meet the requirement for
deploying an Armored Division are in Table 11. Options 1, 3
and 4 utilize maximum containerization while the other options
use minimum containerization.
Some of the vessel options for the deployment of a Light
Infantry division are in Table 12. Note that due to the
relative small size of the cargo no foreign vessels are
required. Maximum contanerization is used in options 3 and 4,
while the remaining options use minimum containerization.
From the data presented in this chapter, the total costs
and total deployment days for each of the units' deployment
options are calculated and presented in Chapter IV.
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TABLE 11. ARMORED DIVISION DEPLOYMENT VESSEL COMBINATION
OPTIONS
Vessel Option Option Option Option Option Option
Type 1 (a) 2 3 (a) 4 (a) 5 6
FSS 4.67 8












Note: (a) Maximum containerization is used.
TABLE 12. LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION DEPLOYMENT VESSEL
COMBINATION OPTIONS
Vessel Option Option Option Option Option Option









RORO I III_ I_
Note: (a) Maximum containerization is used.
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS
Chapter IV examines the trade-offs between speed, vessel
types, voyage route and load ports. Cost and time are used to
measure the trade-offs. As will be shown, many times one
trade-off is offset by another. To best understand sealift
costs, each of the cost classifications in Chapter III must be
analyzed individually and then their impact on the total cost
must be analyzed. Sealift choices must also be analyzed on
the basis of total deployment time. From these trade-offs
between costs and total deployment time, a decision can be
made which will ensure more efficient use of DOD's limited
resources.
A. TOTAL DEPLOYMENT COSTS AND DEPLOYMENT DAYS
From the data presented in Chapter III, the total costs
and total deployment times per option were determined. Total
costs are based on the cost incurred while inport loading and
unloading, and on the round trip transit to and from Ad
Dammam. Deployment times were calculated by summing the total
days in port to load and discharge the vessel and the transit
time one way to Ad Dammam. The return trip from Ad Danuam is
not included in the total deployment time calculations.
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For ships transiting from Oakland it is assumed that they will
spend one day each way refueling at an enroute port.
Tables 13, 14 and 15 present the costs for the movement of
an Armored Division from Oakland, Mobile and Norfolk
respectively. The options used in these tables are the vessel
mix alternatives presented in Table 11 of Chapter III.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 graphically depict this data.
Tables 16, 17 and 18 provide the costs for the movement of
a Light Infantry Division from Oakland, Mobile and Norfolk
respectively. The options in these tables are the vessel mix
alternatives presented in Table 12 of Chapter III. Figures 6,
7, and 8 graphically display this data.
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TABLE 13. TOTAL COST AND DEPLOYMENT DAYS, PER OPTION, FOR
THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN ARMORED DIVISION FROM OAKLAND














40 No. 6No. 4No. I No. 2
20
0
35.71 37.71 67.71 74.48 81.21 86.47
Total Deployment Days
Figure 3. Total Cost and Deployment Days, Per Option, for
the Deployment of an Armored Division From Oakland
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TABLE 14. TOTAL COST AND DEPLOYMENT DAYS, PER OPTION, FOR
THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN ARMORED DIVISION FROM MOBILE





















38.5 40.5 102.9 107.76 124.5 127.36
Total Deployment Days
Figure 4. Total Cost and Deployment Days, Per Option, for
the Deployment of an Armored Division From Mobile
32
TABLE 15. TOTAL COST AND DEPLOYMENT DAYS, PER OPTION, FOR
THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN ARMORED DIVISION FROM NORFOLK




















38.5 40.5 102.9 107.76 124.5 127.36
Total Deployment Days
Figure 5. "otal Cost and Deployment Days, Per Option, for the
Deployment of an Armored Division from Norfolk
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TABLE 16. TOTAL COST AND DEPLOYMENT DAYS,PER OPTION, FOR THE
DEPLOYMENT OF A LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION FROM
OAKLAND

















10 No. 1 N.2N.4
5
0 19.43 29.71 35.91 37.58 41.71 43.38
Total Deployment Days
Figure 6. Total Cost and Deployment Days, Per Option, for
the Deployment of a Light Infantry Division from Oakland
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TABLE 17. TOTAL COST AND DEPLOYMENT DAYS, PER OPTION, FOR
THE DEPLOYMENT OF A LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION FROM
MOBILE











No. 2 No. 4
5
0
20.5 27.18 37.5 41.77 52.5 53.77
Total Deployment Days
Figure 7. Total Cost and Deployment Days, Per Option, for
the Deployment of a Light Infantry Division from Mobile
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TABLE 18. TOTAL COST AND DEPLOYMENT DAYS, PER OPTION, FOR
THE DEPLOYMENT OF A LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION FROM
NORFOLK






















38.5 40.5 102.9 107.76 124.5 127.36
Total Deploymenl Days
Figure 8. Total Cost and Deployment Days, Per Option, for
the Deployment of a Light Infantry Division from Norfolk
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B. ROROs COMPARED TO BREAKBULKS
Figures 3 through 8 show that ROROs (FSS, CAPE H class, C7
and commercial ROROs) are the least expensive means to move an
armored division and light infantry division. For example in
Figure 3, options 1 and 2 are the cheapest for moving an
armored division; both these options, as discussed in Chapter
III, use only ROROs. This, however, contradicts our intuition
that the faster the deployment, the higher the costs. Table 19
lists the total cost (total operating cost plus total voyage
cost) per vessel type from each port.
TABLE 19. TOTAL COST PER VESSEL TYPE
Vessel Type Oakland Mobile Norfolk
FSS $2,786,213 $2,953,831 $2,673,411
CAPE H $2,791,245 $2,703,339 $2,447,760
C7 $2,816,947 $2,720,319 $2,442,830
U.S. RORO $1,941,913 $1,952,118 $1,757,545
Foreign RORO $1,675,934 $1700,436 $1,560,469
C3 $2,784,914 $2,690,435 $2,452,811
C4 $2,924,583 $2,811,425 $2,559,670
U.S. $1,056,752 $1,108,432 $1,023,116
Breakbulk
Foreign $912,491 $987,790 $908,369
Breakbulk
Although Table 19 shows the commercial breakbulks as the
least expensive vessel per single voyage, from the options it
is known that more breakbulks are required to deploy a unit
due to their relatively small carrying capacity. To better
understand the total cost figures in Table 19, they have been
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converted into cost per notional square foot. Table 20 lists
the notional square foot (SQ FT) and cost per square foot per
vessel type. Due to the variation in vessel cargo capacity
this is a standard and more accurate means of comparing the
costs among the vessel types.
Table 20 shows that, per square foot, the ROROs are less
expensive than the breakbulks. This explains why the RORO
options were the least expensive.
TABLE 20. VESSEL COST PER NOTIONAL SQUARE FOOT (SQ FT)
Vessel Oakland Cost Mobile Cost Norfolk Cost
(Thousand per SQ FT per SQ FT per SQ FT
SQ FT)
FSS (150) $18,575 $19,706 $17,823
CAPE H (139) $20,081 $19,448 $17,610
C7 (115) $24,495 $23,655 $21,242
U.S. RORO $16,886 $16,975 $15,283
(115)
Foreign RORO $14,573 $14,786 $13,569
(115)
C3 (48) $69,623 $67,261 $61,320
C4 (40) $60,928 $53,326 $58,571
U.S. $23,483 $24,632 $22,736
Breakbulk
(45)




C. SPEED'S IMPACT ON PER DIEM AND FUEL COSTS
As discussed in Chapter II, speed impacts both per diem
and fuel costs. The trade-offs between vessel speed and costs
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for the government owned and commercial ROROs are presented in
Table 21. Table 21 shows the warranted speed, round trip
transit time (days), total per diem and total fuel costs per
voyage for each RORO.
TABLE 21. RORO TOTAL PER DIEM AND FUEL COSTS PER ROUND TRIP
TRANSIT FROM OAKLAND AT WARRANTED SPEED
Vessel Warranted Round Trip Total Per Total Fuel
Type Speed Transit Diem Cost Cost
Time (Days)
FSS 30 36.85 $918,895 $1,783,486
C7 20 48.28 $1,000,000 $793,600
CAPE H 18 57.42 $1,140,000 $476,794
U.S. 17.5 58.89 $1,649,050 $258,801
RORO
Foreign 16.9 60.76 $1,384,700 $193,311
RORO 1
Table 21 shows that the FSS have the lowest total per diem
cost. Although the daily per diem for the FSS is greater than
the other government ROROs, this is offset by the shorter
total voyage time due to the higher speed. This inverse
relationship between total voyage time and total per diem
costs is easily demonstrated with the government ROROs.
The per diem rate for both vessels is $20,000 per day.
The C7 warranted speed is 20 knots and is charged for 48 days
of per diem (user is not charged for less than a half day's
use). The CAPE H has a warranted speed of 18 knots and
requires 57 days to make the journey. As can be seen in Table
21, the C7, with the higher warranted speed and shorter voyage
time, has a lower total per diem cost than the CAPE H.
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Table 21 confirms our intuition about the trade-off
between cost and speed. The total fuel costs for government
vessels in Table 21 show that the faster the vessel the higher
the fuel costs. The vessel costs which are dependent on
speed, fuel and per diem costs, were summed and their totals
are in Table 22. Table 22 shows that, for each government
owned RORO, the sum of the speed dependent costs are higher
for fast vessels and lower for the slower ones.
TABLE 22. TOTAL COST OF PER DIEM AND FUEL FOR THE ROROS






Although the same can be said of the commercial vessels,
Table 21 shows that the U.S. RORO, while faster than a foreign
RORO, has higher total per diem and total fuel costs. This can
be explained by looking at the per diem rates, fuel
consumption rates, and fuel prices presented in Chapter III.
The U.S. RORO not only consumes more fuel than a foreign RORO,
it also has a higher per diem rate. Additionally, even though
the U.S. ship burns a cheaper fuel ($13.64 per barrel) than
the foreign RORO ($14.33), this is offset by the greater
amount of fuel the U.S. RORO consumes. Because of the
complexity of the costly and expensive regulations under which
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U.S. flag vessels operate, and the government-mandated
priority system under which vessels are acquired (as discussed
in Chapter II), this thesis will include little discussion of
the trade-offs between employing U.S. or foreign owned
vessels.
D. THE IMPACT OF SUEZ CANAL TRANSITS ON TOTAL VOYAGE COST
When comparing the total voyage costs for the FSS, U.S.
RORO, foreign RORO, U.S. breakbulk, and foreign breakbulk in
Table 19, the cost of a round trip from Oakland is at least
slightly less than the cost of a round trip from Mobile for
the same vessel. This is interesting because the voyage from
Oakland is much longer, 22,012 nautical miles vice 19,160
nautical miles from Mobile. Because of vessel routing, the
vessels deploying from Mobile and Norfolk must go through the
Suez Canal and therefore incur one more cost than the same
vessels deploying from Oakland.
Figure 9 compares the total costs of the six options when
deploying an armored division from the three ports. Options
1, 2, 4 and 6, which rely on the use of the FSS and commercial
vessels, show that it costs more to deploy the division from
Mobile than Oakland.
Figure 10 compares the total costs of the six options when
deploying a light infantry division from the three ports.
Options 1, 4 and 6, which also employ the FSS and commercial








1 2 3 4 5 6
Option Number
SOakland i Mobile , Norfolk
Figure 9. Comparison of the Total Costs per Option for the
Deployment of an Armored Division from the Three Load Ports
The U.S. breakbulk can be used to show how the cost of a
canal transit can make the cost per square foot more expensive
if a unit is deployed from Mobile rather than Oakland. Table
23 shows cost per square foot for per diem and the applicable
voyage costs. As costs are calculated they are cumulated in
the column to the right of the individual cost. Table 23
shows that, while per diem and fuel costs for a commercial
breakbulk deploying from Oakland are higher than a like vessel
from Mobile, once the canal fee is added it becomes more
expensive to deploy this type vessel from Mobile. The same







1 2 3 4 5 6
Option Numrber
SOakland = Mobile ,\NN Norfolk
Figure 10. Comparison of Total Cost per Option for the
Deployment of a Light Infantry Division from the Three Ports
TABLE 23. SQUARE FOOT PER DIEM AND VOYAGE COSTS FOR A U.S.
BREAKBULK DEPLOYING FROM OAKLAND AND MOBILE
Cost Oakland Cost Oakland Mobile Cost Mobile
per Square CuM. Per Square CuM.
Foot Total Foot Total
Per diem $17,044 $17,044 $14,947 $14,947
Fuel $5,744 $22,788 $4,985 $19,932
Canal $0 $22,788 $4,000 $23,932
Port $578 $23,336 $578 $24,510
Overhead $117 $23,483 $123 $24,633
The following equation can be used to determine at what
total voyage length, measured in days, a vessel sailing on a
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route through the Suez Canal will have costs equal to the same
vessel deploying from Oakland:
D= TCO+DI (FU+FI) -C
PD +FU
where: D - total voyage days
TCO = total cost Oakland
FU - fuel cost per day underway
DI = total voyage days inport
FT = fuel cost per day inport
C = Canal Cost
PD = per diem cost
Using this equation it can be determined that any round trip
voyage of a U.S. breakbulk greater than 54 days that requires
a Suez Canal transit will cost more than deploying the same
vessel from Oakland.
E. THE IMPACT OF ACTIVATION AND DEACTIVATION COSTS
The activation and deactivation fee is allocated across
all the voyages that a ship is expected to make in an
arbitrary time frame of 255.5 days. Therefore the activation
and deactivation fee is dependent upon voyage length
(distance). In addition to analyzing the impacL of the fee
calculated in this manner, it is important to consider two
other ways of allocating this fee. The first is to do as was
done during Desert Shield and have the Navy pay the fee with
no cost to the user. The second is to assume the user is the
first user of the RRF vessel and therefore charge him the
entire cost of activation, $1.5 million.
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1. Activation and Deactivation Fee Based on Voyage Length
(Distance)
As previously discussed the costs of a Suez Canal
transit can significantly impact the total cost of a vessel.
In the case of the FSS and commercial vessels, if the same
vessel is deployed from each of the three ports, the
deployment from Mobile will be the most expensive. Table 20
shows that the cost per square foot for these vessels is less
when deployed from Oakland than Mobile. However, Table 20
also shows that the RRF vessels cost the most per square foot
when deployed from Oakland. This is because the savings from
not paying a canal fee when deploying from Oakland are offset
by the relatively large activation and deactivation fee for
vessels sailing from Oakland.
As discussed in Chapter III, the activation and
deactivation cost is dependent upon the length, measured in
distance, of the deployment. For the same RRF vessel the
total deployment distance from Oakland is greater than the
deployment distance from the other two ports. Therefore the
activation and deactivation cost is higher for the same vessel
sailing from Oakland.
Once again the measure of square foot is used to
analyze the various costs. The CAPE H class will be used to
show the impact of the activation and deactivation fee. The
cumulative costs per square foot for deploying a CAPE H from
the three ports is in Table 24.
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TABLE 24. CUMULATIVE (CUM) SQUARE FOOT (SQ FT) COSTS FOR
CAPE H
Cost Oakland Cum. Mobile Cum. Norfolk Cum.
Cost per SQ FT Cost per SQ FT Cost per SQ FT
Per Diem $8,201 $7,194 $6,475
Fuel $11,631 $10,165 $9,099
Port $11,798 $10,332 $9,266
Canal $11,798 $12,167 $11,101
Overhead $11,997 $12,360 $11,275
A & D $20,081 $19,449 $17,610
Looking at the cumulative figures it can be seen that
as costs are added for the CAPE H vessel, it is initially more
expensive to deploy from Oakland. Once the canal costs are
added it becomes more expensive to deploy from Mobile.
Finally, when the activation and deactivation fee is added it
becomes, once again, more expensive to deploy from Oakland.
2. No Activation and Deactivation Fee
Table 25 and Figure 11 show the total cost per option
for each of the three ports with no activation and
deactivation fee. Without this fee, for each vessel type,
Mobile has the highest total cost among the three ports. As
can be seen in Table 25 and Figure 11, because the activation
and deactivation fee no longer offsets the impact of the canal
transit fee, Mobile becomes the most costly of the three ports
to deploy from.
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TABLE 25. TOTAL COST FOR DEPLOYMENT OF A LIGHT INFANTRY
DIVISION WITH NO ACTIVATION AND DEACTIVATION FEE
Option Oakland Mobile Norfolk
Number
1 $8,275,053 $8,778,817 $7,940,030
2 $5,006,015 $5,153,432 $4,695,140
3 $8,232,947 $8,446,238 $7,726,031
4 $8,335,263 $8,656,132 $7,947,397
5 $18,330,558 $18,773,725 $18,254,261











No. I No. 2 No. 3 No. 4 No. 5 No. 6
Option Number
QOaklond = Mobile \N. Norfolk
Figure 11. Total Cost for Deployment of a Light Infantry
Division, per Option, with the User Paying no Activation
Cost
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3. Impact of Total Activation Fee Only
When the assumption is changed so that the user pays
the entire activation fee of $1.5 million the results are
presented in Table 26 and graphically displayed in Figure 12.
As can be seen the cost of the activation fee, because it is
not dependent on voyage length, does not offset the canal
transit costs. Therefore because a constant figure is added
to each of the options, once again the options are more
expensive from Mobile than Oakland. Using Figures 10, 11 and
12, the effect of different activation and deactivation
allocation schemes can be compared with respect to both vessel
assignment options and ports.
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TABLE 26. TOTAL COST, PER OPTION, FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF A
LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION WITH THE USER PAYING THE
ENTIRE ACTIVATION FEE
Option Oakland Mobile Norfolk
Number
1 $8,275,053 $8,778,818 $7,940,031
2 $9,535,865 $9,683,282 $9,224,990
3 $22,2283,722 $22,549,176 $21,241,400
4 $8,335,263 $8,658,132 $7,947,396
5 $35,510,658 $35,953,825 $34,406,578









No. I No. 2 No. 3 No. 4 No. 5 No. 6
Option Number
SOakland i Mobile \ Norfolk
Figure 12. Total Cost, per Option, for the Deployment of a
Light Infantry Division with the User Paying the Entire
Activation Fee
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F. PORT LOADING CAPABILITY AND ITS IMPACT ON TOTAL DEPLOYMENT
TIME.
Load port can significantly impact total deployment times.
The number of vessels a port can handle per day helps
determine how long it will take to deploy a unit. Oakland can
handle more vessels at one time than the other two ports.
Option 3 for the movement of an armored division requires
37.88 breakbulk vessels. Table 27 shows the number of
breakbulks which can be accommodated at one time per port and
the total days inport required to load and discharge an
armored division. It was previously assumed that Ad Dammam is
able to accommodate as many vessels as the load port can. In
other words, if Norfolk can load three breakbulks at one time,
Ad Dammam will discharge three breakbulks at one time.
However if Oakland loads six breakbulks at one time Ad Dammam
will discharge six breakbulks at one time.
TABLE 27. PER PORT THE NUMBER OF BREAKBULKS HANDLED AT ONE
TIME AND TOTAL DAYS FOR DEPLOYMENT OF AN ARMORED
DIVISION USING OPTION 3
Port Number of Breakbulks Total Days Inport




As can be seen, Oakland can load twice the number of
breakbulks Norfolk can at one time. As a result these vessels
are loaded in approximately half the time it would take to
load a unit in Norfolk.
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G. TRADE-OFFS AMONG VESSEL MIXES
Not only are there trade-offs among the vessel classes but
there are trade-offs among the vessel mixes. This becomes
evident when comparing in Table 25 the total costs of options
1 and 4 for deployment of a Light Infantry Division from
Mobile and Norfolk. When deploying a division from Norfolk,
option 1, with 2.97 FSS, is the third least expensive and
option 4, with 6.50 U.S. breakbulk and one U.S. RORO, is the
fourth least expensive. The opposite is true foc Mobile with
option 4 being the third least expensive and option 1 being
the fourth least expensive.
Table 28 shows the cumulative total costs for options 1
and 4 from Mobile and Norfolk. Table 29 shows the percent of
the total cost accounted for by the five cost categories: per
diem, fuel, port, canal and overhead. Figure 13 graphically
presents the cumulation of costs for the two options from the
two ports.
TABLE 28. CUMULATIVE TOTAL COSTS FOR OPTION 1 AND
OPTION 4 FOR A LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION DEPLOYING
FROM MOBILE AND NORFOLK
Cost Mobile Mobile Norfolk Norfolk
Option 1 Option 4 Option 1 Option 4
Per Diem $2,434,078 $5,522,630 $2,139,039 $4,997,980
Fuel $7,034,960 $7,104,353 $6,212,619 $6,397,159
Port $7,121,684 $7,286,053 $6,299,343 $6,578,859
Canal $8,615,053 $8,613,052 $7,784,343 $7,907,859
Overhead $8,778,817 $8,656,128 $7,940,030 $7,947,398
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TABLE 29. COST CLASSIFICATION PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL COSTS
FOR OPTIONS 1 AND 4 FOR A LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION
DEPLOYING FROM MOBILE AND NORFOLK
Cost Mobile Mobile Norfolk Norfolk
Option 1 Option 4 Option 1 Option 4
Per Diem 27.73% 63.80% 26.95% 62.89%
Fuel 52.40% 18.27% 51.31% 17.60%
Port 1.00% 2.10% 1.09% 2.29%
Canal 16.93% 15.33% 18.71% 16.7t
i Overhead 1.94% .50% 1.94% .50%
Using Tables 28 and 29 and Figure 13, comparison of the
options highlights a number of trade-offs previously
discovered and how they can be applied to vessel mixes. The
trade-offs between speed and fuel and per diem can be seen by
comparing options 1 and 4 for each port. Both options 1, with
the faster FSS's, show that the faster ship has the majority
of its costs allocated to fuel (52.4% for Mobile and 51.31%
for Norfolk). The slower option, option number 4, has the
majority of its cost allocated to per diem (63.8% for Mobile
and 62.89% for Norfolk). This confirms our intuition that
speed and per diem costs are inversely related while speed and
fuel costs are directly related.
When comparing the total costs of the different options we
can compare the effect of using different ships and their
associated differing costs. Not only do the ships have
different per diem and fuel costs but they also have differing










0 Mobile 1 Mobile 4 Norfolk 1 Norfolk 4
Port and Option Number
Per Diemr Fuel .\%" Port
SCanal /% Overhead
Figure 13. Cumulative Costs for Options 1 and 4 from Mobile
and Norfolk
the different vessels making up an option are totaled the
option rankings based on cost change.
For example, after fuel and per diem costs are totaled in
Table 28, from both Mobile and Norfolk option 4 is more
expensive than option 1. After port costs are added in this
remains true. However once canal costs are added, option 1
becomes more expensive than option 4 when deploying from
Mobile, but when deploying from Norfolk option 4 is still more
expensive than option 1.
From this it can be concluded that at some voyage distance
the cost of per diem and fuel offsets the impact of the canal
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costs. This breakeven point can be determined by setting the
two options equal to each other and solving for distance. In
the case cf this example the breakeven point would fall
between the round trip distances of Norfolk, 16,848 nautical
miles and Mobile, 19,160 nautical miles.
As costs are cumulated and their impact upon total cost is
assessed it is important to also compare the time to complete
deployment for each option. As shown in Table 18, from
Norfolk option 1, the fastest means of deployment with a total
deployment time of 20.5 days, is slightly cheaper than option
4, the fourth ranked with a deployment time of 41.77 days.
However Table 17 shows that from Mobile option 4, with the
fourth ranked deployment time of 40.6 days, is somewhat
cheaper than option 1 with the fastest deployment time of
22.19 days.
While Norfolk has a shorter underway time for all vessels,
for options one and four total deployment time is longer than
the options deploying from Mobile. This can be attributed to
port capability and the number of vessels which can be loaded
at one time. As seen in Table 27, Norfolk can handle fewer
vessels at one time than Mobile. Therefore total deployment
time for some vessel mixes is longer from Norfolk than Mobile,
a port which requires more time underway.
This chapter has shown that to fully understand trade-offs
one must first understand how costs are assigned. Once costs
are defined and calculated they must be analyzed both
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individually and as a total. By comparing the impact each
cost classification has on the total cost, the trade-offs
among vessel type, route selection, load port and speed of
deployment can be seen. This trade-off analysis then becomes
important in ensuring the most efficient use of resources when
making sealift vessel assignments.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
While the trade-offs discussed in this thesis are just
some of those to be considered when assigning sealift, they
highlight the importance of trade-off analysis. It is clear
that trade-offs must be considered so that the most efficient
use of resources will be realized. Although DOD, due to
numerous government regulations, does not have the freedom the
commercial world does in acquiring sealift, it still can
utilize trade-off analysis. In fact, due to these
regulations, trade-off analysis is more important because of
the uniqueness of some of the costs involved.
This thesis has emphasized some important trade-offs.
Intuition has proven correct and the faster ships do have
higher fuel costs. However, faster ships do mean lower per
diem charges. In most cases though the lower per diem charges
do not offset the increased cost of fuel.
Vessel route also impacts cost. A deployment from the
West Coast of the United States, with a greater distance to
travel then the same deployment from East and Gulf Coast
ports, will not necessarily cost more. The Suez Canal transit
fees are steep and can offset the cost of traveling an extra
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1500 nautical miles. For an exercise or redeployment,
consideration should be given to the economic feasibility of
canal transits. Possibly a trip around the Cape of Good Hope,
while adding days to the journey, could save money. Another
possibility could be deploying a unit from a West Coast port
rather than an East Coast port assuming inland transportation
charges do not offset these savings associated with avoiding
the canal transit. Once again another trade-off.
The allocation of activation and deactivation fees for RRF
vessels can greatly impact the total cost of deployment. It
may seem rational to assign costs proportional to the length
of time the vessel was used. However, this represents an
arbitrary allocation of fixed costs which has no inherent
advantage with respect to other means of allocation. Because
price should be equal to variable costs, DOD should pay the
entire fee. if not, users in the name of fiscal conservatism,
would use any means possible to avoid having their cargo
transported on relatively expensive RRF vessels.
While the variance in the number of ships a port can
handle at one time may not change the total price of a
deployment, it can add to or subtract from the total
deployment time. While this can not be the sole determinant
of load port it should be given consideration when planning a
multi-ship deployment. It should be noted that this thesis
assumed the piers presently available at the three ports would
be used. In a time of war, commercial and empty military
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berths would be made available. However, the manpower
constraint could still exist. Further analysis of sealift
trade-offs should include a study of different throughput
capabilities for each port.
As vessel mixes are considered for a deployment the trade-
offs between vessel types should also be considered. When
viewed alone, one type of ship among the available types of
vessels may have the least expensive total deployment costs.
However, due to vessel capacity and cost structure, using only
this one type of vessel does not necessarily yield the
cheapest total deployment cost for a unit. As vessel types
are combined for deployment of a unit, their individual
capacities and cost structure will be reflected in the total
deployment cost of a unit.
This thesis has also shown that a faster means of
deployment, such as with the FSS, does not necessarily cause
a higher total deployment cost. This needs to be considered
when allocating transportation dollars. While it makes sense
to assign high priority cargo to the faster ships, such as the
FSS, it also makes sense to allocate more money for the
movement of this high priority cargo. However, Chapter IV has
shown that the use of smaller, slower breakbulks to move
either a Light Infantry Division or Armored Division is more
expensive than using the faster ROROs. Therefore, when
allocating transportation dollars, consideration should be
given to the fact that the movement of low priority cargo may
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in fact cost more if the slowest options which employ
breakbulks are used. If sufficient funds are not allocated to
move cargo assigned to the more costly breakbulks, commanders
will not be able to afford to move their entire unit.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
This analysis of trade-offs is by no means complete. When
deploying a unit, sealift is not the only means of
transportation to be used. Inland units must be transported
to the port. The costs and capabilities of land
transportation must be compared to sealift costs from each
port. Once again trade-offs will occur. To fully understand
the trade-offs of a deployment, inland and sealift cost must
be analyzed together. Analysis of inland cost in a manner
similar to that used in this thesis could be used to identify
and compare the trade-offs among all phases of transportation.
For a better understanding of the trade-off between speed
and fuel, fuel consumption data over different ranges of speed
for each vessel type, and if possible each vessel, should be
collected. While this could be costly and almost impossible
to accomplish in the commercial world, for the government-
owned or controlled vessels this could be accomplished during
exercise deployments or RRF breakouts.
From this data, fuel consumption curves could be built and
more accurate estimates of costs could be determined when a
change in vessel speed is being considered. With this
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information, the trade-offs between cost and operational
considerations could be better analyzed. An example of such
an operational consideration is whether a ship's speed should
be increased so that it can make the next canal transit or
arrive within the tide window on Thursday vice Friday,
Further analysis of the trade-offs within and between
vessel types should be accomplished to ensure an accurate
understanding of costs. Collecting cost data and developing
a data base from which this analysis can be done is necessary.
This data base would include all transportation costs
including per diem, fuel, port charges, canal fees and
overhead. The data base would provide a better understanding
of costs and aid in making the best vessel acquisition and
assignment decisions possible.
C. FINAL NOTE
As budgets shrink and commanders are given increased
responsibility for their decisions and the associated costs,
it is important that commanders understand the trade-offs they
face. These trade-offs consider operational commitment,
measured in time, and fiscal resources, measured in dollars.
The best decision is not necessarily that which is cheapest;
instead it is the one which optimizes the trade-offs. In other
words, the commander deploys his unit in a manner which not
only meets the CINC's priorities but which makes the most
efficient use of his resources and meets the fiscal
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constraints of both his budget and applicable regulations. At
this point no other allocation of available resources can
improve the exchange between trade-off factors and
optimization has been achieved. This is when the commander
makes the most fiscal and operationally responsible decision.
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